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WHAT IS PUNISHMENT IMPOSED FOR?
George P. Fletcher
The institution of punishment invites a number of philosophical que-
ries. Sometimes the question is: How do we know that inflicting discom-
fort and disadvantage is indeed punishment? This is a critical question,
for example, in cases of deportation or disbarment proceedings.' Classi-
fying the sanction as punishment triggers application of the Sixth
Amendment and its procedural guarantees. In other situations the ques-
tion might be: Why do we punish? What is the purpose of making people
suffer? In this context, we encounter the familiar debates about the con-
flicting appeal of retribution, general deterrence, special deterrence, and
rehabilitation.
In this article I wish to pose a different sort of question: What is pun-
ishment imposed for? When those convicted of crime are punished prop-
erly, I assume that they are being punished for something. Yet it is not
clear what this "something" is. In tort cases, we ordinarily say that com-
pensation is paid for the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Note that this
connection between the injury and compensation holds regardless of the
purpose one advocates for tort liability. Even those who subscribe to the
programs for promoting efficient behavior would not say that compensa-
tion is paid for the efficient consequences of imposing liability. Compen-
sation can be paid only for something that has already happened.
When x (compensation, punishment) is imposed for y, then y must be
a state of affairs that has already occurred. Even if one believes, as I do,
that punishment is an expression of solidarity for victims, 2 the expression
of solidarity could not satisfy the requirements of the variable y. The
grammar here is interesting. It would be correct to say that compensa-
tion is required "for the sake" of deterrence or that punishment is im-
posed "for the sake" of solidarity, but not correct to say that either form
of liability is imposed simply for deterrence or solidarity. In this context
the preposition "for" demands not a goal but an untoward state of
affairs.
The reason that compensation and punishment are imposed for some-
thing that has happened is that both institutions function, at least in
part, as remedies. They are responses to something that has happened.
Damages remedy the injury, or at least they are supposed to. The scope
of tort injuries sets the ambit of the damages. Now what does punish-
ment remedy? Unfortunately, the answer is not readily at hand.
Perhaps we could reason backwards in the following way: if a certain
factor conventionally increases punishment, then that factor should be
Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
1. See George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), pp. 410-14.
2. See George P. Fletcher, "Symposium: Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime," University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review 141 (1993): 1617-1638.
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included in that for which the offender is punished.3 This inference ob-
tains in the case of torts. The scope of the injuries determines the dam-
age award, and damages are paid for the injury. Whatever determines
the degree of punishment, then, should be that for which punishment is
imposed. Unfortunately, the connection is less plausible in the case of
criminal punishment than in tort law. There are many factors that ag-
gravate punishment, with seeming legitimacy. Note the role of prior con-
victions, lack of remorse, and other factors that indicate that an offender
is dangerous. The need for social protection may dictate a higher punish-
ment in this situation even though the offender is not being punished for
symptoms of likely recidivism. The question what the offender is pun-
ished for, therefore, remains a puzzle.
Let us consider some possible answers.
1. Injury
One might be tempted to draw an analogy from tort law and argue
that as compensation is paid for injury, punishment is also inflicted for
the injury that occurs to the victim of violent crime or property damage.
This might be the thought underlying the claim that retributive punish-
ment itself is a form of compensation.
Before resolving this suggestion, we should clarify a few terms. Com-
pensation offers the party who deserves something in place of damage
suffered or labor expended. It differs from restitution, which typically
restores the status quo ante by returning to the injured party something
that has been taken from her. There can be restitution, it seems, of
money or things taken, but not of labor expended or of damage suffered.
The fact of compensation recognizes that the clock can not be turned
back, that a surrogate for the loss is the only response possible. Restitu-
tion enjoys the illusion of erasing the loss, leaving as the only damage the
period of time during which the aggrieved party properly claimed
restitution.
Restitution comes closer than does compensation to Aristotle's ideal of
corrective justice. Aristotle reasoned that wrongful acts created an im-
balance in the equilibrium established under criteria of distributive jus-
tice.4 The injurer causes a loss and as a result, a shift of resources occurs
from the victim to the injurer.5 Corrective justice requires that the in-
jurer give half of the imbalance as a payment to the victim. This pay-
ment restores the status quo ante: the just distributive equilibrium is re-
instated by eliminating loss to the victim and the corresponding gain to
the injurer. What is "corrected" according to the view is neither the
3. I am indebted to Russell Christopher for this suggestion.
4. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (on distributive justice)(David Ross trans., 1925), § 1131a.
5. Ibid., p. 1131b (on rectificatory or corrective justice).
[VOL. 5:101
What Is Punishment Imposed For?
wrong nor the loss, but the imbalance that has occurred in the distribu-
tive scheme.
One could imagine a legal system in which punishment came close to
the concept of compensation. This seems to have been the approach of
ancient talmudic law, which conceived of all possible sanctions as points
on a single scale of justice between the injurer and the injured. Suppose
that A assaults B. Under the shared approached of modern legal sys-
tems, the following legal consequences ensue. B may repel the attack in
self-defense. B may sue A in tort for the injuries suffered in the initial
assault; and this is true regardless of whether he successfully repels the
attack. In addition, A might be prosecuted for the crime of assault. All
three of these responses are possible, and the use of one has no bearing
on the others. But talmudic law espoused the principle that invoking the
more severe sanction preempted the less severe.6 If the victim sought
punishment of the offender, he could not demand damages thereafter.
This is a version of double jeopardy that makes sense in a system that
ranks all sanctions on a single linear scale of severity. For good or for ill,
we have come to see self-defense, punishment, and tort suits as parallel
and non-exclusive responses to those who threaten and do harm to
others. Our concept of punishment presupposes this structure of parallel
remedies and responses.
It is hard to imagine a criminal injury to a person (as opposed to ab-
stract entities such as "the administration of justice") that would not
also be compensable in tort. If punishment were compensation, one
would wonder why the victim should be compensated twice, once in tort
and then again by putting the offender in jail or imposing some other
sanction on him. Of course, in some situations the offender is judgment-
proof in tort. But the principle of punishing crime is designed for rich
and poor alike. True, the defendant's having made restitution may bear
upon sentencing. Voluntary amends by the offender presumably provide
evidence of good character to counterbalance, in part, the evidence pro-
vided by the crime itself. The rationale for a lighter sentence is not that
the restitution takes the place of the justified punishment.
Of course, in tort the victim sues; in a criminal case, the state takes
the lead. But the difference between punishment and compensation, or
between crime and tort, lies not only in the identity of the suing party.
The structure of liability also differs. The underlying principle of tort law
is the separation of the criteria of liability from the criteria of damages.
Once liability is established, the plaintiff recovers the full amount of her
injuries, regardless of how tenuous the liability link might have been.
This principle is expressed in the "eggshell skull" rule: even if the extent
6. On the principle kimle bdraba mina, see George P. Fletcher, "'Punishment and Self Defense,"
Law and Philosophy 8 (1989): 201-215, 203.
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of the injury is unforeseeable and therefore beyond the injurer's fault,
the victim recovers in full.7
The principle of reducing liability on the basis of contributory negli-
gence as well as the principle of compensation according to "market
shares" represent seeming exceptions to this principle. In these cases, the
criteria of liability have a bearing on the degree of damages. In fact,
both institutions are reconcilable with the general principle that the in-
juring party must pay for all the damage that he or she causes. Contrib-
utory negligence should be understood as a division of damages based on
relative degrees of causation. The same with the principle of "market
share" liability, which simply apportions causal responsibility over the
class of injuries as a whole.'
Criminal law places a different emphasis on the occurrence of harm.
So far as fault matters (and not strict liability), the degree of the defend-
ant's fault (blameworthiness, or culpability) bears on the degree of liabil-
ity. The difference between common law murder and manslaughter lies
not in the damage done, but in whether the killer acts with malice. Tort
damages do not depend on whether liability is based on negligent or in-
tentional wrongdoing. Yet in tort cases, juries decide the issue of dam-
ages as well as of liability; this enables the jury informally to consider
the degree of fault in setting the level of damages. In criminal law, the
way in which the harm is done - negligently or intentionally, by act or
omission - determines the level of liability as a matter of principle.
Criminal juries are permitted to consider issues in assessing liability that
tort juries raise covertly in setting the level of damages.
In view of all these differences between the two types of sanction, the
interpretation of punishment as compensation enjoys particular tenacity.
The root of "retribution," namely "retribuere," conveys the idea of "pay-
ing back." And there is indeed an analogy between the ideas of compen-
sation and paying back, or returning to the offender that which he has
done. Foucault's interpretation of punishment as reenacting the crime on
the body of the offender, captures the same idea.9 Vergeltung in German
conveys the same point of applying to the offender that which he has
imposed on the victim.
It is tempting to mischaracterize retribution as requiring that the
same offense be committed on the offender. If the offender rapes, he
should be raped in return. Admittedly, the unfortunate metaphors of the
lex talionis support this reductio ad absurdum. It is not clear that Exo-
dus chapter 22 really meant "eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." The
rabbis of the Talmud understood the text to require a life for a life -
under certain conditions of culpable killing. But they readily interpreted
7. Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891); Restatement (Second) of Torts 461 (1965).
8. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 6-7 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. den.
449 U.S. 912 (1980).
9. See generally Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Pantheon, 1979).
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the rest of the bodily references to require compensation for injuries suf-
fered by those physical harms short of death.
Kant developed a version of retribution that clearly had nothing to do
with returning the crime in kind. The central message in Kant's teaching
is that punishment should bring home the meaning of the crime to the
criminal offender. Thus he proposes castration as the proper punishment
for rape, and exile for other sex offenders who display what he took to be
an inability to live in civilized society.1" The only sensible punishment for
theft, he taught, was imprisonment as the functional equivalent of com-
mitment to the "poor house." The thief should be treated as someone
who displays contempt for the value of property and thus as someone
who, himself, has no property." This is not a matter of reenacting the
crime on the body of the offender, but of forcing the offender to confront
the meaning of his acts.
Thus we may conclude: In tort, compensation is paid and received for
the injury, in criminal cases, the punishment is imposed not for the harm
done, but, it seems, for some other aspect of the actor's conduct. What
could that other aspect be?
2. Wrongdoing
If one inmate turns to another and asks another, "What are you in
for?" the response would normally include a reference to what the in-
mate did - some action that he or she performed. The answers would
typically be the names of crimes themselves: drunk driving, selling crack,
or "bumping someone off." The appropriate description of the action
would include a reference to the norm implicitly violated. These conven-
tional understandings of why men and women are imprisoned provides
some guidance to what, as a conceptual matter, punishment is imposed
for. It is imposed for the act of wrongdoing, the unjustified violation of a
statutory norm.
H.L.A. Hart hints at the same point when he lists the following ele-
ments defining the concept of punishment:
[1] Punishment must involve pain or other consequences normally consid-
ered unpleasant.
[2] It must be for an offense against legal rules.
[3] It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offense.
[4] It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the
offender.
[5] It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a
legal system against which the offense is committed. 2
10. Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor trans., 1991), p. 169.
I1. Ibid.. p. 142.
12. H.L.A. Hart, "Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment," in H. L. A. Hart, Punishment
and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 4-5.
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The point underscored in this list is that punishment is imposed for the
offense committed by an actual or supposed offender. The offense is a
violation of a prohibition against a specific action or a prescription re-
quiring a particular action. I refer to this violation of the norm as wrong-
doing. It might be worth adding a word on behalf of this usage if for no
other reason than that in this symposium Michael Moore asserts the con-
trary: "wrongdoing" supposedly refers only to causing harm."3 It follows
for his purposes that attempts and other non-harmful inchoate offenses,
such as possession offenses, are not wrongful; they are not instances of
wrongdoing.
Consider the prohibited possession of a weapon. The mere act of pos-
session causes no harm - though it may generate a risk of accidental
discharge or of purposeful misuse. It is not clear why Moore balks at
labelling the knowing violation of the statutory prohibition as an instance
of wrongful behavior. Surely he would have to say that the knowing pos-
session of the weapon violates the law: it is unlawful. Referring to an
action as wrongful provides another description of the same state of af-
fairs. The term "wrong" underscores the positive evaluative content of
the law as Right (Recht, droit, derecho, diritto):'" a state of affairs in-
compatible with the Right is wrong. It is that simple. Moore's effort to
link wrongdoing to causing harm defies common sense.
Yet the question remains whether wrongdoing is aggravated by the
occurrence of harm. Virtually everybody insists that this is true. Legisla-
tures routinely punish drunk driving that causes death more severely
than simple drunk driving.' 5 The usual pattern of liability imposes a
greater sanction on attempts that succeed as opposed to attempts that
fail. 6 Yet there is a great temptation in the academic world to support a
skeptical position about the relevance of harm to the degree of
wrongdoing.17
The skeptical view goes something like this. Individual actors can be
culpable only for matters within their control - their absolute control.
The only thing we have absolute control over is the movement of our
bodies. We have no control over what happens to a bullet after it is fired,
over what happens to poison placed in someone's drink, over whether
13. Michael S. Moore, "The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing," Journal of Contem-
porary Legal Issues 5 (1994): 237-281, 240.
14. On the two concepts of law, see George P. Fletcher, "Two Modes of Legal Thought," Yale Law
Journal 90 (1981): 970-1003, 980-84.
15. James B. Jacobs, Drunk Driving: An American Dilemma (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1989), pp. 83-85.
16. The notable exception is the Model Penal Code § 5.05(l), which recognizes as its default rule
that "'attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious
offense that is attempted or solicited or is an object of the conspiracy." According to the commentaries
to the Code, only a few states have adopted this principle. See 2 American Law Institute, Model Penal
Code and Commentaries 486 (1985). Even the reformist Model Penal Code concedes, however, an ex-
ception for the most serious offenses. See Model Penal Code § 5.05(l)(sentence 2).
17. See, e.g., Stephen Schulhofer, "Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Result of
Conduct in the Criminal Law," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 122 (1974): 1497-1607.
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someone hired to kill actually carries out the plan, or over whether a
woman consents or does not consent to a seduction with gentle force.
Crimes should be defined, therefore, independently of these conse-
quences. It follows that attempted homicide and attempted rape-crimes
defined solely on the basis of what the actor intends at the time of act-
ing-should be punished no less than the completed offenses.
It is clear, however, that this academic effort runs afoul of the public's
sensibilities of wrongdoing and its degrees. The average person regards
an actual killing as worse than a miss, an overcoming of the partner's
will as worse than a case in which the woman happens to consent. Some
theorists claim that this common view reflects a penchant for neurotic
guilt, that if the average person were well informed, he or she would
come around to the sophisticated view advocated by the academics.
There is no basis for thinking that this common view is neurotic, that
it reflects some displacement of guilt. Yet the popularity of the common
view has little impact on the theoretical conviction that control over one's
bodily movements determine the outer limit of culpability and liability.
This ongoing dispute presents, in the end, a conflict between two cultures
in criminal law, one tied to common sense, the other reflecting what
Bruce Ackerman once dubbed "scientific policy making."18 I put little
stock in the latter, but I am aware how difficult it is to address and
convince those who do. If punishment is tied to shared cultural judg-
ments of wrongdoing, then harming is clearly a greater wrong than try-
ing or preparing to harm. It follows that the result, when it occurs, is
part of the action for which an offender is punished.
The ordinary language of crime as well as religious sin supports the
view that the result is part of the action. Prohibitions are always directed
against killing, maiming, destroying, and other harmful actions. The Ten
Commandments are directed to results such as dishonoring one's parents
and desecrating the sabbath. The interesting exception is the Tenth
Commandment: thou shalt not covet that which belongs to thy neighbor.
Still the imperative is against actually coveting, not against trying or
attempting to covet. No one would formulate a moral imperative simply
against trying to commit these harms. In the culture of crime and pun-
ishment, as we know it, the harmful result inheres in the action
prohibited.
Inchoate offenses are always derivative. They are designed to catch the
offender in the preparatory stages where he may merely frighten the po-
tential victim or take an excessive risk of harming someone (drunk driv-
ing). Because they are derivative and less intrusive in the rights of poten-
tial victims, they understandably receive a lower punishment.
Admittedly, this sensible conclusion has yet to generate a compelling
philosophical foundation. Moore believes that he has furnished one in
18. Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977), pp. 10-22.
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this symposium, but Russell Christopher's Appendix to this article dem-
onstrates that though Moore's intuitions are in the right place, his logic
is wanting. The search for a convincing account of our intuitions in this
area remains unsatisfied.
3. The Relevance of Culpability
To speak of culpability is presumably to speak of culpability for some-
thing, for an act, a state of affairs, a violation of the law. In this respect,
the structure of culpability parallels the concept of punishment. As the
latter is not simply imposed without an object of punishment, culpability
does not exist in the abstract. One is culpable for something untoward
that has happened - for causing harm, for violating the law, for wrong-
ful behavior. Similarly the excuses that negate culpability - mistakes of
fact and law, duress and personal necessity, insanity - are excuses for
having brought about the same untoward state of affairs.
Yet one often hears theorists of the criminal law say that offenders
deserve punishment only if they are culpable - culpable in the abstract,
without specifying what it is the actor is culpable for. This is notable
among those who reduce culpability to an event of consciousness, such as
intending or choosing to do something. This way of speaking suggests
that the punishment is imposed for culpability itself. Those who take this
line of thought characteristically have difficulty recognizing negligence
as a genuine form of culpability. This is the position that Michael Moore
finds himself in. 19 In a less sophisticated way, Jerome Hall took this line
a generation ago.20
Some trends in criminal law support this way of thinking. The vener-
able requirements of mens rea and actus reus are treated as indepen-
dent, parallel pillars of liability. This seems to imply that mens rea or
"culpability" can be analyzed separately from the realization of an actus
reus in the external world. This disposition is reflected in the current
practice of penalizing impossible attempts. The actor thinks that sugar is
cyanide and puts it in the intended victim's coffee. If there is a convic-
tion in this case, what would the punishment be imposed for? The crimi-
nal act, it is said, is the taking of steps toward the execution of criminal
intent. Yet it would not make sense to punish the act as it appears to
others, namely as putting sugar in coffee. From the perspective of possi-
ble victims, the act itself is innocent and harmless. The only thing unto-
ward in the situation is the intent to kill. The intent renders the act
criminal, and then this act doubles as that for which the actor is deemed
culpable. The circularity disquiets.
19. See Michael Moore, "Choice, Character, and Excuse," Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1990):
29, 58 ("perhaps negligence by itself does not merit any moral blame").
20. Jerome Hall. "Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal Liability," Columbia Law
Review 63 (1963): 632.
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Maybe we would never have arrived at this state of criminal law if we
took the rights of victims seriously in thinking about retributive punish-
ment. Punishing harmless impossible attempts that frighten no one
would hardly make sense if we take the victim's perspective. The partic-
ular act is not dangerous. If anything it is the actor who may be danger-
ous. But this shift from a dangerous act to a dangerous actor is morally
monumental. Impossible attempts come into relief as the expression of a
wicked intent. The would-be poisoner shows himself to be dangerous and
therefore punitive intervention is supposedly justified. Yet this a curious
form of retributive thinking. It is in fact early intervention and preven-
tive confinement masquerading as punishment.
The significant feature of culpability, as it bears on punishment, is
that it comes in degrees. The person who kills under provocation or while
suffering from diminished capacity acts with partial culpability. In sen-
tencing, the presumptively reduced culpability of those who are contrite
or who have made amends has the impact of reducing punishment. This,
as I pointed out earlier, is the feature that renders criminal liability dif-
ferent from tort liability.
The intersection of two factors, then, determines the level of punish-
ment that justly fits the crime. One is the scale of the wrongdoing; the
other is the degree of culpability. They come together in this formula
devised by Robert Nozick: P = r.H. The level of punishment equals the
degree of responsibility (varying from 0 to 1) times the scale of wrongdo-
ing. Causing rather than just risking harm increases the scale of the
wrongdoing. Bringing about the harm negligently rather than intention-
ally reduces the "r" factor.
Punishment is imposed, therefore, for wrongdoing as reduced by the
extent to which culpability is diminished. This way of understanding
punishment is lost on those who think of culpability as an independent
factor or even as the central factor in structuring criminal liability. Yet
it may be lost on others as well. For as I argued at the outset, thinking of
punishment as imposed for something attributes to punishment the ca-
pacity to rectify some untoward state of affairs. We live, however, in an
era of skepticism about whether it is really possible to bring out harmony
in the moral order or metaphysically to vindicate right over wrong. In
these anti-mystical times we need to bring punishment back to the peo-
ple who are directly affected by whether it is imposed or not.
4. The Duty to Punish as a Double Negative
It may be easier to justify punishment not as a positive remedy for
wrongdoing but rather as the absence of an evil. The evil is abandoning
victims in their suffering and isolation. Recently, I argued that blackmail
should be understood as a paradigmatic crime, wrong because, like other
crimes of violence, it establishes a relationship of dominance and subor-
19941
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dination between the criminal and the victim.2 1 I continue the argument
here. The claim is that punishment is imposed in order to avoid the evil
of not punishing.
Blackmail, theft, embezzlement, all leave a wake of dominance and
subordination. Rape victims have good reason to fear that the rapist will
return, particularly if the rape occurred at home or he otherwise knows
her address. Burglars and robbers pose the same threat. Becoming a vic-
tim of violence beyond the law means that what we all fear becomes a
personal reality; exposure and vulnerability take hold and they continue
until the offender is apprehended. It would be difficult to maintain that
all crimes are characterized by this feature of dominance. The most we
can say is that this relationship of power lies at the core of the criminal
law. It is characteristic of the system as a whole.
2
The way to counteract the power of the criminal over the victim is for
the state to intervene with power over the person of the criminal. It is not
enough to make the offender pay damages or a fine, for all this means is
that she purchases her ongoing status beyond the prohibitions that apply
to others. The state must dominate the criminal's freedom, less the crim-
inal continue his domination of the victim. The deprivation of liberty and
the stigmatization of the offense and the offender - these means
counteract the criminal's dominance by reducing his capacity to exercise
power and symbolically lowering his status.
Punishment expresses solidarity with the victim and seeks to restore
the relationship of equality that antedated the crime. This may not be so
obvious in a culture that has become accustomed to thinking of punish-
ment as a utilitarian instrument of crime control. The way to appreciate
the psychological significance of the state's standing by the victim is to
think about the cases in which the state refuses to prosecute and thereby
abandons the victim in solitary suffering. During the terror in Argentina
that led to approximately 9000 desparecidos prior to 1983, many vic-
tims' families realized, to their horror, that they could not turn to the
police. The police were often the ones engaged in the roundup of sus-
pected terrorists. The failure of the state to come to the aid of victims, as
expressed in a refusal to invoke the institutions of prosecution and pun-
ishment, generates moral complicity in the aftermath of the crime. The
failure to punish implies continuity of the criminal's dominance over the
victim. Not only the criminal can trigger a relationship of dominance
and subservience. The state can effect the same relationship by failing to
invoke the customary institutions of arrest, prosecution and punishment.
The problem is whether this argument is offered as a rationale for
retributive punishment or as identification of the nexus between punish-
21. See note 2. supra.
22. Homicide seems to be a special case. We could treat the decedent's loved ones as secondary
victims, but they do not suffer from the same fear of recurrence that characterizes other forms of violent
crime.
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ment and the criminal act. Does it make sense to focus on the relational
aftermath of the crime as that for which punishment is imposed? Signifi-
cantly, the plaintiff's injury, also an aftermath of the liability-creating
incident, provides the requisite nexus for compensation. And we noted at
the outset that we sought an account of punishment that would be as
clear as the proposition that tort compensation is awarded for injuries
sustained. Attempting to draw the parallel in the context of punishment,
however, encounters grammatical problems. One cannot quite say that
the punishment is imposed for the dominance the criminal acquires over
his victim. The sanction may be imposed to counteract or neutralize this
dominance, as compensation is awarded to rectify injuries sustained. But
this might not be enough.
The factors of desert as well as remedy seem to control the grammar
of "compensating for" and "punishing for." The victim deserves compen-
sation for the full extent of her injuries, provided liability is established.
The criminal may deserve punishment on the basis of what he has done,
but not, it seems, for the advantage that he acquires in the crime. Also,
focussing on the relational aftermath of the crime rather than on the
crime itself might not generate the fine gradations we have noted in the
formula P = r.H. The scale of wrongdoing and the degree of culpability
are features of the act, not of the relationship of dominance the act es-
tablishes. We are drawn to the aftermath of crime in order to understand
why we impose punishment, but to grasp what punishment is imposed for
we must stick to the crime itself - in all its subtlety and fine grained
distinctions. That we no longer grasp punishment as a remedy for the
crime is a contradiction that we cannot so easily escape.
APPENDIX: CONTROL AND DESERT: A COMMENT ON
MOORE'S VIEW OF ATTEMPTS
Russell L. Christopher*
Should a consummated criminal offense be punished more than an at-
tempt to commit the same offense, by the same actor, that fails? The
issue of the relevance of harmful results to an actor's moral desert has
engaged the attention of many moral philosophers and criminal law the-
orists. The convening of this Symposium which, at least in part, ad-
dresses this fundamental question testifies to its continuing vitality and
its capacity to evoke sharp disagreement.
Proponents of the irrelevance of harmful results have focused on the
element of accident, chance, luck or fortuity determining whether a
criminal attempt succeeds or fails. Whether a bullet strikes and kills its
* Research Associate. Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful to George Fletcher for his
criticisms of an earlier draft.
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intended target or misses due to a sudden gust of wind, a sudden move-
ment of the victim, or a bird deflecting the bullet's path is outside the
control of an actor. Events or causal factors outside the control of the
actor should not be an indicia of an actor's moral desert. Only for that
which the actor can control is she responsible; only that for which she is
responsible can contribute to her moral desert. In essence, moral luck' is
rejected as a relevant determinant of an actor's desert.
In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Michael Moore
stakes out his claim for the "independent moral significance of wrongdo-
ing."2 Although Moore finds culpability to be a necessary and sufficient
condition for the imposition of punishment, he maintains that wrongdo-
ing (harmful results), when coupled with culpability, is a relevant deter-
minant of moral desert and increases the amount of punishment that
may be imposed. In confronting the view that harmful results are irrele-
vant, what Moore terms the "standard educated view," Moore rejects
its premise that the harmful results of intended actions are outside an
actor's control. Since harmful results are within an actor's control, an
actor may be held responsible for them. Harmful results increase an ac-
tor's moral desert, which in turn justifies the imposition of increased
punishment.
Moore's method of argumentation is to assume that the premise of the
standard educated view is true and to demonstrate that it generates a
reductio ad absurdum. Moore concludes that in order to avoid the absurd
consequences following from that premise, the consequences of intended
actions must be considered within an actor's control.
The importance of Moore's ingenious argument cannot be overstated.
If he is right, the standard educated view's most powerful argument
(that the results of intended actions are outside the control of an actor),
is rendered absurd. The focus of this Comment is to assess the validity of
Moore's reductio ad absurdum of the standard educated view. The Com-
1. For a discussion of the problem of moral luck see Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
2. Michael S. Moore, "The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing," Journal of Contempo-
rary Legal Issues 5 (1994): 237-281.
3. Ibid. p. 238. Moore cites the following adherents to the standard educated view: Model Penal
Code § 5.05(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); Andrew Ashworth, 'Criminal Attempts and the Role
of Resulting Harm under the Code, and in the Common Law," Rutgers Law Journal 19 (1988): 725;
Lawrence Becker, "Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes," Philosophy and Public
Affairs 3 (1974): 262; Joel Feinburg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1970), p. 3 3 ; James Gobert, "The Fortuity of Consequence," Criminal Law Forum 4 (1993): I; Hyman
Gross. A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 423-436; H.L.A.
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 129, 131; Sanford
Kadish, "Tracking the Irrational in the Criminal Law," unpublished Faculty Research Lecture, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, 1993; Richard Parker, "Blame, Punishment, and the Role of Result,"
American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984): 269-276; Steven Schulhofer, "Harm and Punishment: A
Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law," University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 122 (1974): 1497-1607; Michael Zimmerman, "Luck and Moral Responsibility," Ethics 97
(1987): 374.
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ment will conclude that Moore's argument generates its own reductio ad
absurdum and is thus untenable.
Moore first shows that we cannot control the causal factors enabling
us to act. Suppose Smith forms a firm intention to shoot and kill Jones.
Yet Smith may lack the opportunity: Jones is never alone, Jones has
moved out of the area, Smith keeps having his gun stolen. Additionally,
Smith may lack the capacity: as Smith is about to pull the trigger he
sees a ghost which unnerves him, Smith is so happy at the prospect of
finally killing Jones that he gets overexcited and cannot coordinate his
fingers. Just as actors cannot control the factors which will dictate
whether a bullet that is fired with the intent to kill will succeed (wind
speeds, movements of the victim, a bird flying in the way, a quantum
shift etc.), so also Smith cannot control a myriad of factors intervening
between the formation of the intent to kill and pulling the trigger. Since
Smith cannot control these factors preventing him from acting, his acts
cannot be relevant in ascertaining moral desert. Thus punishment cannot
be imposed for acts.
Moore then demonstrates that we cannot control whether we form a
firm intention to murder. Suppose Smith is very angry at Jones for tak-
ing his job. Given sufficient time, Smith would have formed the firm
intention to kill Jones. But due to factors outside Smith's control he
never gets the opportunity: Jones dies, Jones gets fired, Smith is injured
and cannot take the job etc. Additionally, Smith might lack the capacity
to form the intention because of factors outside his control: each time
Smith is about to form the intent to kill Jones dust sends Smith into
sneezing fits, he faints, his arm goes numb etc. Since we cannot control
the factors which determine whether we form a firm intention to kill,
having a culpable firm intention to kill is irrelevant in assessing moral
desert. Thus we cannot impose punishment for culpability.
Since results, acts, and firm intentions are outside our control, Moore
suggests the only basis left for moral responsibility is character. Yet
Moore argues that due to genetic factors and environmental influences
during our youth, which we have no control over, our character is also
largely outside our control. Moore confronts the possible objection that
"who we are is our character, so that fortuities in determining who we
are are irrelevant."" Yet Moore deftly responds that if character can be
a basis for moral desert, despite our inability to control the factors mold-
ing our character, then our inability to control the factors determining
whether we firmly intend, act or produce harmful results fails to bar
them as objects of punishment. Thus producing harmful results is a
proper basis for determining moral desert.
Moore concludes that the narrow sense of control advocated by those
who reject harmful results as a basis for punishment leads to the reduc-
tio ad absurdum that none of the possible bases for moral desert is suffi-
4. Moore, supra note 2, p. 279.
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ciently within our control. Thus no one is responsible for any criminal
violation and no one is deserving of punishment. The only alternative to
this absurdity, Moore argues, is to accept that we are in control of our
intentions, acts and the harmful results which we produce. Thus one can-
not claim that our lack of control over harmful results disqualifies harm-
ful results as a basis for moral desert and punishment.
Despite the ingenuity of Moore's argument, it is seriously flawed.
Moore's contention that a reductio ad absurdum ensues from barring
harmful results due to their being outside an actor's control proves too
much. In Moore's preferred, broad "sense of control we also control
whether or not we execute our general choices with volitions, and in this
sense of control we control our bodily movements when we will them
with our volitions. Further, in this sense of control, we control the gun in
our hand, and we control the bullet, its impact on the victim, and his
death . . . ."' But if we control the bullet, as Moore claims, and the
bullet nonetheless misses, then we controlled the bullet missing the tar-
get. If the bullet misses, then we didn't intend to kill after all. An at-
tempt that fails is not subject to attempt liability because the actor, con-
trolling the bullet, must not have intended to hit the victim.
In attempting to derive a reductio ad absurdum of the narrow sense of
control, Moore's argument lends itself to its own reductio ad absurdum.
Moore's argument, purporting to show that harmful results are relevant,
eviscerates attempt liability. The ensuing anomaly is that an actor with a
firm intention to kill who merely commits a prepatory overt act or sub-
stantial step is subject to attempt liability. Since the actor has not yet
had a chance to fail, his failure has not yet negated his intent. An actor
who shoots and misses, however, escapes liability altogether because he
did not have the requisite culpable intent. If he did have the requisite
culpable intent, since he controls the bullet, he necessarily would not
have missed. Since the actor did miss and the actor controls the path of
the bullet, it necessarily must be the case that he intended to miss and
that he did not intend to produce the harmful result. Moore might reply
that we only control the results of our actions when we succeed. Yet
Moore cannot simultaneously argue that when an actor intends to kill
and succeeds that he was in control and also claim that when an actor
attempts and misses, he was not in control. If we control the results of
our intended actions, as Moore claims, we control the result both when
we succeed and when we fail.
Moore might respond by accepting the reductio but denying the ab-
surdity. Perhaps when we shoot and miss we are conflicted about
whether we truly wish to kill the victim. Professor Alan Dershowitz
raises this possibility in an article written while he was a law student.'
5. Ibid., p. 271-74.
6. Alan Dershowitz, Note, "Why Do Criminal Attempts Fail? A New Defense," Yale Law Journal
70 (1960): 160-169.
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Although this claim might be true in a small number of cases, it clearly
does not obtain in every instance of a failed attempt. Yet Moore is not
merely making the empirical claim that occasionally we can explain a
failed attempt by maintaining that the actor never really intended to
complete the offense. By virtue of Moore's preferred, broad sense of con-
trol, the results of all actors' intended actions are necessarily within their
control. Thus if an actor fails, it must necessarily have been due to the
actor not really intending to cause the harm. Another difficulty for
Moore in denying the absurdity is that it contradicts one of Moore's as-
sertions. Moore himself believes that trying to kill is morally relevant: "it
seems to matter whether one actually tried to execute one's intention to
kill or not."17
The absurd implications of Moore's own reductio argument perhaps go
further. Under Moore's broad sense of control, virtually everything is
within an actor's control. Thus an actor who commits the requisite overt
act or substantial step necessary for attempt liability but who fails to
take the last step, for whatever reason, must not have really intended to
produce the harmful result. Since it is within an actor's control to take
the last step, to pull the trigger and to kill the victim, the actor's failure
to do so may only be explained by the fact that he did not truly intend to
do so. Thus under Moore's broad sense of control, all attempt liability is
eliminated. Furthermore, liability for other inchoate offenses e.g., con-
spiracy is eliminated: the actor's failure to complete the offense can only
be explained by the fact that she did not truly intend to commit the
consummated offense.
Again Moore might respond by accepting the reductio but denying the
absurdity. Perhaps for Moore placing the relevance of harmful results
for an actor's moral desert on firm footing is worth the cost of eliminat-
ing attempt and other inchoate offense liability. Yet this move might be
difficult for Moore. He is already committed to the view that culpability
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the imposition of punishment.
Yet if attempt and other inchoate offense liability is eliminated, only
offenses involving harmful results could be punished. There never would
be an instance of an actor with culpability alone receiving punishment.
Moore's assertion that culpability is a necessary and sufficient condition
for punishment would be superfluous, if not contradictory.
In light of the absurd consequences flowing from Moore's reductio ad
absurdum of the standard educated view, as well as the difficulties for
Moore in denying that they are absurd, Moore's argument that we con-
trol the results of our intended actions must be rejected. The ensuing
conundrum for theorists is that the narrow sense of control arguably bars
punishing for harmful results whereas, the broad sense of control argua-
bly dispenses altogether with attempt and other inchoate offense liability.
7. Moore. supra note 2, p. 274.
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